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—  Note  — 
Are Intelligence-Community 
Leakers Internationally 
Protected Whistleblowers or 
Simply “Whistling in the Dark”? 
Assessing the Protections 
Afforded to Intelligence-
Community Whistleblowers 
under International Law 
Abstract 
On June 9, 2013, the public discovered the source of the 
earthshattering stories revealing the full extent of the United States 
intelligence-gathering apparatus. Edward Snowden allowed the publi-
cation of his name and background at his own request because, as he 
claimed, “I know I have done nothing wrong.” This was the first public 
stage of the odyssey of Edward Snowden, whose quest for asylum or 
refugee status carried him from Hong Kong to a Moscow airport where, 
after failing to obtain secure passage to Latin American destinations, 
he was eventually granted asylum in Russia. Snowden found himself in 
a relative legal limbo, unable to gain asylum from most countries or 
safely access those countries that considered offering it. This Note 
analyzes the protection afforded under current international asylum and 
refugee law to intelligence community employees who leak information 
exposing perceived government misconduct. It also examines and 
considers the merits of possible means for improvement. While intelli-
gence community whistleblowers may qualify as refugees or asylees 
based upon the political nature of their actions, the legal framework 
does not adequately address the situation in a consistent fashion. Alter-
ations can and should be made to international refugee and asylum law, 
which would better protect good-faith intelligence community whistle-
blowers who expose government misconduct. 
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Introduction: An Intelligence Community Leaker’s 
Search for Asylum 
In June 2013, The Guardian published a series of groundbreaking 
articles revealing the unfettered access of the U.S. government to 
internet and phone records, either directly or through FISA1 court-
ordered acquisition of records held by private corporations.2 The source 
 
1. The Foreign Intelligence Service Court (“FISA”) was established under the 
Foreign Intelligence Service Act in 1978. See generally United States 
Foreign Surveillance Court, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/ [https:// 
perma.cc/F7KB-CSY9] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) (“The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court was established by Congress in 1978. The Court enter-
tains applications made by the United States Government for approval of 
electronic surveillance, physical search, and certain other forms of inves-
tigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes.”). 
2. See generally Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions 
of Verizon Customers Daily, The Guardian (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/NQC7-FBKY] (revealing Verizon’s 
court-ordered relinquishment of millions of Americans’ phone records); 
Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, Wash. Post 
(June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html 
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of these revelations was an unknown government contractor, Edward 
Snowden, who supplied this information to journalists from a hotel 
room in Hong Kong. As evidence, Snowden had four laptops in his 
possession containing, by one estimation, more than 1.5 million class-
ified documents3 he accessed while employed by the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) in Hawaii.4 The release of Snowden’s identity was not 
a mistake or the result of an investigation, but rather the intentional 
act of a man who considered himself to be, as conveyed by his 
journalist-contact Glenn Greenwald, a whistleblower.5 Snowden 
asserted, “I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have 
done nothing wrong.”6 The Obama Administration, however, did not 
 
[https://perma.cc/5X8T-WMCL] (describing the PRISM program, through 
which “[t]he National Security Agency and the FBI are tapping directly into 
the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, extracting audio 
and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that 
enable analysts to track foreign targets . . . .”); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen 
MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The NSA’s Secret Tool to Track Global 
Surveillance Data, The Guardian (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-
global-datamining [https://perma.cc/JR49-M49R] (detailing the NSA tool, 
Boundless Informant, that allows the agency to record and analyze metadata 
and track, inter alia, the location or source of a piece of information). 
3. H.R. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Executive Sum-
mary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former 
National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden (2016) 
[hereinafter Intelligence Committee Executive Summary]. This num-
ber cited by the Intelligence Committee has been criticized in some quarters. 
See, e.g., Barton Gellman, The House Intelligence Committee’s Terrible, 
Horrible, Very Bad Snowden Report, The Century Found. (Sept. 16, 
2016), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/house-intelligence-committees-
terrible-horrible-bad-snowden-report/ [https://perma.cc/8P53-L4KS] (“In 
fact, the nation’s most senior intelligence officers, no admirers of Snowden, 
have repeatedly said they can only surmise the number.”); Trevor Timm, 
The Washington Post is Wrong: Edward Snowden Should be Pardoned, The 
Guardian (Sept. 19, 2016, 4:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2016/sep/19/washington-post-wrong-edward-snowden-pardon 
[https://perma.cc/DM84-CW7E] (“Even the former NSA director himself 
admitted that the 1.5m number only represented the documents that Snowden 
‘touched’, and officials didn’t know how many he actually took.”). 
4. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The 
Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, The Guardian 
(June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/ 
09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance [https://perma.cc/TQN8-
RENK]. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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consider Snowden’s public disclosures to constitute legitimate whistle-
blowing.7 On June 14, 2013, the U.S. government issued a complaint 
against Snowden8 for theft of government property9 and espionage.10 
Congress also sent an official request to Hong Kong for his extradition.11 
Rather than return to the United States and face criminal sanction, 
Snowden instead cast about the international community for a safe 
haven.12 
Though Snowden’s subsequent transnational trek consisted only of 
a trip from Hong Kong to Moscow, it was accompanied by uncertainty, 
widespread media speculation, and heightened diplomatic stakes.13 
 
7. See Aamer Madhani & David Jackson, Obama: I Don’t See Snowden as a 
Patriot, USA Today (Aug. 9, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2013/08/09/obama-news-conference/2636191/ [https:// 
perma.cc/C2YA-HFL6] (“[Obama] said Snowden’s leaks, which have come 
out in dribs and drabs, have unfairly set the impression that the U.S. gov-
ernment is spying on its citizens.”). 
8. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265, (E.D. 
Va. June 14, 2013). 
9. 18 U.S.C. 641 (2012) (“Whoever . . . steals . . . or knowingly converts to his 
use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of 
any record . . . of the United States or of any department or agency thereof 
. . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, 
or both . . . .”). 
10. 18 U.S.C. 793(d) (2012) (prescribing penalties for unauthorized collection 
and communication of national defense information); 18 U.S.C. 798(a)(3) 
(2012) (prohibiting willful communication of “intelligence activities of the 
United States” to an unauthorized person); see also Criminal Complaint, 
supra note 8 (charging Snowden with violations of: “18 U.S.C. 641[,] Theft 
of Government Property[;]” “18 U.S.C. 793(d)[,] Unauthorized Communi-
cation of National Defense Information[;]” and “18 U.S.C. 798(a)(3)[,] Willful 
Communication of Classified Communications Intelligence Information to an 
Unauthorized Person”). 
11. Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files—Timeline, The 
Guardian (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline [https://perma.cc/GP2M-
ZXE3]. 
12. Haroon Siddique, Edward Snowden Asylum: Countries Approached and 
Their Responses, The Guardian (July 4, 2013, 11:38 AM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/edward-snowden-nsa-asylum-
application-list-countries [https://perma.cc/DHJ3-V2T4] (citing Snowden’s 
statement that he had applied for asylum in a total of 21 countries to that 
date). 
13. See, e.g., Michael Pearson, Matt Smith & Jethro Mullen, Snowden’s Asylum 
Options Dwindle, CNN (July 2, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://www.cnn 
.com/2013/07/02/politics/nsa-leak/ [https://perma.cc/QX49-BNWV] 
(describing Snowden’s limited options). 
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Snowden checked out of his Hong Kong hotel room on June 14th and 
disappeared until June 23rd, when he boarded a flight to Moscow.14 
Snowden faced substantial hurdles in his efforts to resist extradition 
and secure safe passage to a country willing to grant asylum. He had 
intended for Moscow to be a temporary layover to allow for a 
connecting flight to Cuba, but the U.S. government derailed that plan 
by cancelling Snowden’s passport, preventing further international 
travel.15 He found himself stranded in Sheremetyevo Airport, applying 
for asylum status in more than twenty countries, including China, 
Austria, Finland, India, Spain, and Switzerland.16 Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela offered him permanent asylum, but Snowden 
chose to apply for temporary asylum in Russia because of concerns that 
he could not access a safe, direct route to one of those four countries 
from Moscow.17 Russia declined to extradite Snowden to the United 
States and, instead, granted him a one-year temporary asylum,18 which 
Russia extended for three more years in the summer of 2014.19 
Edward Snowden’s case illustrates the challenging predicament for 
intelligence-community employees20 who leak information exposing per-
ceived government misconduct. Though many government employees 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Siddique, supra note 12 (including European countries such as Iceland, 
Italy, Ireland, Norway, and Poland). 
17. Phil Black, Laura Smith-Spark & Michael Martinez, Snowden Meets with 
Rights Groups, Seeks Temporary Asylum in Russia, CNN (July 13, 2013, 
9:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/world/europe/russia-us-
snowden/ [https://perma.cc/K6H2-RBDS]; see also Emily C. Kendall, Note, 
Sanctuary in the 21st Century: The Unique Asylum Exception to the 
Extradition Rule, 23 Mich. St. Int’l L. Rev. 153, 170 (2014) (“Four 
countries offered him permanent asylum: Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela. However, Mr. Snowden chose to apply for temporary asylum in 
Russia because he did not feel he would be able to safely travel to any Latin 
American country, since Bolivian President Evo Morales's flight from Russia 
to Bolivia had been rerouted and denied airspace in France, Spain, and Italy 
due to suspicions that Mr. Snowden was on board.” (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted)). 
18. Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant Russia Grants Snowden 
Year’s Asylum, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/02/world/europe/edward-snowden-russia.html? [https://perma.cc/ 
23XB-FBFT]. 
19. Isabel Gorst, Russia Gives Edward Snowden Asylum for Three More Years, 
L.A. Times (Aug. 7, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/ 
europe/la-fg-russia-snowden-asylum-20140807-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J5W8-3UYD]. 
20. The focus of this Note is on the employees of agencies and governmental 
departments (including employees of contractors for those bodies) whose 
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or contractors may wish to challenge what they perceive as unethical, 
illegal, or corrupt practices within the workplace, many do not have the 
legal and institutional protections needed to come forward safely.21 De-
pending on the nature of the information disclosed, attempts to bring 
complaints and revelations to the press can result in criminal charges.22 
Snowden’s case is noteworthy because, unlike other intelligence-
community leakers,23 he evaded domestic law enforcement and entered 
the international legal realm. 
Snowden’s travails reveal much about the current protections 
afforded to intelligence-community leakers under domestic and inter-
national law. Should Edward Snowden and other leakers be classified 
as whistleblowers, deserving of protection under domestic whistleblower 
laws? If not, do they instead qualify for the extraterritorial protections 
afforded to refugees or asylees under international law? If the leakers 
do constitute whistleblowers, but are denied safe harbor under both 
domestic and international law, what can or should be done to better 
address and protect those employees and contractors exposing govern-
ment misconduct? 
 
“principal function [is] conducting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
activities,” including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 
National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. See Rodney M. Perry, Cong. Research Serv., 
R43765, Intelligence Whistleblower Protections: In Brief 2 (2014) 
(citations omitted) (describing the agencies covered by intelligence agency 
whistleblower statutes). 
21. Simon Wolfe, Mark Worth, Suelette Dreyfus & A J Brown, Whistleblower 
Protection Rules in G20 Countries: The Next Action Plan, Blueprint for 
Free Speech 1, 21 (2014), https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0010/619075/Whistleblower-Protection-Rules-in-G20-
Countries-The-Next__-Action-Plan-June-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5DZ-
TVG4] (indicating that only two G20 countries have “very/quite compre-
hensive provisions outlining what procedures public sector organizations 
must put in place”). 
22. Id. at 59 (noting the U.S. government’s prosecution of intelligence-
community leakers such as Thomas Drake, John Kiriakou, Bradley Manning, 
and Edward Snowden). 
23. This Note uses the word “leaker” with regard to the high profile intelligence-
community figures discussed within, including Edward Snowden. There is 
considerable debate as to whether those figures constitute legitimate whistle-
blowers and the standard use of the term “whistleblower” presupposes their 
legal status. See Dana Farrington, What is Meant by the Term ‘Whistle-
Blower,’ NPR (June 10, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2013/06/10/190380255/what-we-mean-when-we-say-
whistleblower [https://perma.cc/G9LQ-GGPW] (discussing the use of the 
term whistleblower with regard to Edward Snowden and NPR’s decision to 
instead use the term “leaker” in its reporting). 
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This Note will explore the actions of intelligence-community leakers 
and the available safeguards afforded under domestic and international 
law. If, as is frequently the case, intelligence-community leakers are not 
properly shielded by domestic whistleblower legislation, it is also un-
likely that they would qualify for protection as refugees or asylees under 
international law. Because of the gaps in protection afforded to 
intelligence-community employees, modifications to existing whistle-
blower legal frameworks are needed at both the domestic and inter-
national levels to both encourage reporting of government wrongdoing 
and to limit the frequency and extent of large-scale public disclosures. 
 Part I will consider whether intelligence-community leakers con-
stitute whistleblowers. Despite regional and national variances, a fun-
ctional international definition for “whistleblower” can be gleaned from 
the major analyses comparing best practices for whistleblower legis-
lation generally and the intelligence community more specifically. This 
definition can then serve to assess the whistleblower status of several 
high-profile intelligence-community leakers. 
Part II will consider the position of intelligence-community leakers 
under the two separate frameworks of refugee and asylum law. If unable 
to qualify for whistleblower protection under domestic law, would 
intelligence-community leakers nevertheless qualify as refugees suffi-
cient to trigger the protections of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees24 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees?25 If not, do intelligence-community leakers have a sufficient 
legal basis to resist extradition through the political offense exception 
within extradition treaties, a staple of asylum law generally?26 The an-
swers to these questions serve to assess whether intelligence-community 
leakers qualify for protection under existing international law. 
Part III explores possible alterations to intelligence-community 
whistleblower protection. The suggested changes can be grouped into 
two layers of protection: front-end (domestic) and back-end (inter-
national) protections.27  
 
24. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
25. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. Although related to the Refugee 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol is technically an independent instrument. 
26. Christine van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to 
Extradition: Defining the Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative, 17 
Revue Belge de Droit Int’l 741, 741 (1983) (suggesting universal 
acceptance of the political offense exception “can be deduced from the fact 
that almost every extradition law and treaty contains the rule . . . .”). 
27. This Note uses the terms “front-end” and “back-end” solely for charac-
terizing the two layers (domestic and international) of possible whistleblower 
protections. The terms should not be equated or confused with their common 
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In terms of front-end protections, there are several modifications to 
domestic whistleblower legal frameworks that would encourage 
intelligence-community whistleblowing while limiting the frequency and 
extent of large-scale public disclosures. First, states should establish a 
governmental body with greater independence from the executive 
branch to handle whistleblower complaints. Potential intelligence-com-
munity whistleblowers should also be provided with streamlined access 
to intelligence oversight bodies, in which any communications are kept 
confidential from the whistleblower’s superiors. Lastly, public disclosure 
should be retained as an option for intelligence-community whistle-
blowers if the internal mechanisms for disclosure have been exhausted, 
but with a high threshold necessary to qualify. Such a threshold would 
allow for public disclosure in the event of institutional failure to address 
misconduct or illegality, but would protect necessary government se-
crets through strict requirements that whistleblowers first utilize avail-
able internal reporting mechanisms. 
The back-end, or international approaches, would protect 
intelligence-community whistleblowers in the event that domestic 
whistleblower protections are lacking or misapplied. There are two 
possible avenues to enhance intelligence-community whistleblower 
protection at the international level. 
The first, more ambitious approach would focus on the creation of 
a new international instrument such as a treaty or convention. While 
the proposed Snowden Treaty28 is an intriguing first step put forth by 
advocates of intelligence-community whistleblowers, it is redundant in 
its privacy protections and is unlikely to receive widespread acceptance.  
A slightly less ambitious model would involve creating a govern-
ment whistleblowing protocol along the lines of the 1967 Protocol. This 
new international tool would entail adding a defined ‘government 
whistleblower’ category to those protected under the 1951 
Convention,29 which would afford protection to those fearing 
 
usage in the web industry. For information on the latter usage, see, e.g., 
Ivan Codesido, What is Front-End Development?, The Guardian (Sept. 
28, 2009, 12:59 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/help/ 
insideguardian/2009/sep/28/blogpost [https://perma.cc/7H94-56CH] (des-
cribing the Internet discipline of “[f]ront-end or client-side development”). 
28. The Snowden Treaty: A New International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, 
Protection Against Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers, 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/fb845b_89e20fe385844f348fbc79a6ede39a4d.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8L8D-7XVT] [hereinafter The Snowden Treaty].  
29. Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. I(A)(2) (defining refugee as one 
who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”). 
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persecution for exposing government misconduct. Such a protocol could 
include a third-party adjudicator, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (“UNHCR”), to decide the status of 
government whistleblowers. A neutral arbiter could solve the common 
diplomatic and political influence that plagues the refugee or asylee 
determination process and prevents consistent application of refugee 
and asylum law. Even this less ambitious model, however, would likely 
face obstacles similar to those confronting a new treaty. 
The second, more modest approach would work within the existing 
international conventions as currently formulated. Under this second 
scenario, the UNHCR would adjust the guidelines and Handbook30 to 
recommend clearer and enhanced protections for a narrowly-defined set 
of government whistleblowers under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol. It would also consist of intensive encouragement of states to 
adopt the whistleblower guidelines of the G20 Whistleblower Study31 
and the more narrowly tailored Tshwane Principles,32 which address the 
unique situation of intelligence-community whistleblowers. Lastly, the 
guidelines would require that the judiciary, not the executive, determine 
the refugee or asylee status of applicants. 
Collectively, improvements to domestic and international legal re-
gimes would begin to address obstacles encountered by intelligence-
community whistleblowers in their endeavors to report employer wrong-
doing. 
I. Defining “Whistleblower” at the  
International Level 
If refugee or asylum law protections extend to intelligence-
community leakers, a uniform definition of whistleblower is an essential 
 
30. United Nations High Comm’r on Refugees, Handbook on Pro-
cedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979, 
reissued 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/ 
handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-
convention.html?query=handbook [https://perma.cc/TP97-FBJC] [here-
inafter UNHCR Handbook]. 
31. OECD, G20 Anti-corruption Action Plan, Protection of 
Whistleblowers: Study on Whistleblower Protection Frame-
works, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding Principles for 
Legislation (2011), http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/ 
48972967.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDG4-B5Q2] [hereinafter G20 Whistle-
blower Study]. 
32. Open Soc’y Founds., The Global Principles on Nat’l Sec. and the 
Right to Info. (Tshwane Principles) (2013), https://www. 
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/global-principles-national-
security-10232013.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN9V-4XB9] [hereinafter Tshwane 
Principles]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
Are Intelligence-Community Leakers Internationally Protedcted 
Whistleblowers or Simply "Whistling in the Dark"? 
906 
first step to determining what individuals qualify under existing inter-
national legal frameworks. Arriving at a common definition for whistle-
blower at the international level is a challenging endeavor, however, 
because there “is no common legal definition of what constitutes 
whistleblowing[,]”33 at least as applied by states through domestic legis-
lation. 
There are many statutory regimes containing whistleblower pro-
tections. The global community has included whistleblower protections 
in a number of international instruments aimed at curbing corruption.34 
Whistleblower legislation is also present at the state level, which can 
often feature overlapping, fragmented laws that provide varying degrees 
of protection for different categories of whistleblowers.35 The United 
States, for instance, provides whistleblower protection at both the 
state36 and federal level,37 but with a multitude of critical distinctions 
 
33. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 7. 
34. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, arts. 8, 13 & 33, 
Dec. 9, 2003, G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 30, 2004) (encouraging the imple-
mentation of legal and regulatory measures to protect those seeking to report 
corruption); Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption, art. III(8), Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-39, 35 
I.L.M 724 (same); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, arts. IX, X(C)(v), 
Dec. 17, 1997, (encouraging the implementation of legal and regulatory 
measures to protect those seeking to report bribery of foreign public officials).  
35. See Anja Osterhaus & Craig Fagan, Transparency Int’l, 
Alternative to Silence: Whistleblower Protection in 10 
European Countries 3–4 (2d ed. 2009) (finding whistleblowing legislation 
in the ten countries researched was “generally fragmented and weakly 
enforced” with “no single, comprehensive legislative framework in place, with 
the exception of Romania”). 
36. See Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower 
Laws: Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 
Calif. L. Rev. 1633, 1641 (2008) (“Whistleblower statutes are available in 
some form in every state.”) (citation omitted). 
37. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 
Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)) 
(strengthening protections for Federal employees seeking to report violations 
of law, gross waste, mismanagement, and abuse); Act of Oct. 29, 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
5 U.S.C. (2012)) (same); False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733 (2012) (providing procedures and rewards for civil lawsuit 
whistleblowers under the False Claims Act); Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (outlining protections, procedures, and 
remedies for employees who report employer’s violations of the Clean Air 
Act); Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012) (strengthening 
protections for employees seeking to report violations of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954); Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5328 (2006) (outlining protections and remedies for employees seeking to 
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within those statutes and regulations with regard to the definition of 
protected whistleblowing. 
The discrepancies among whistleblower laws lie in the substance of 
what is reported, the categories of people covered by the protections, 
and the procedural requirements of protected whistleblowing. Of these 
elements, the widest variations lie in the procedural requirements 
employees must follow to qualify for protected whistleblower status. 
U.S. state whistleblower statutes differ, inter alia, with regard to 
whether employees are required to provide prior notice to supervisors 
before alerting oversight bodies38 as well as the degree to which em-
ployees must be informed of whistleblowing procedures.39 Viewed 
 
report employer’s violations of the Act); National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1987, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (2012) (protecting employees of federal 
contractors and subcontractors seeking to report gross mismanagement, 
fraud, abuse, and dangers to public health and safety); Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2012) (outlining protections, 
procedures, and remedies for employees seeking to report violations concerning 
health and safety in mine operations); Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (outlining protections, procedures 
and remedies for employees seeking to report violations of federal laws under 
the Act); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (outlining 
protections, procedures, and remedies for employees of publicly traded 
companies seeking to report the company’s violations of federal laws and 
regulations). 
38. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-2973(d)(2) (Supp. 2015) (“No supervisor 
or appointing authority of any state agency shall . . . require any such 
employee to give notice to the supervisor or appointing authority prior to 
making any such report.”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.102(1) (LexisNexis 
2015) (“No employer shall require any employee to give notice prior to 
making such a report, disclosure, or divulgence.”). But see Me. Stat. tit. 26 
§ 833(2) (2016) (“Subsection 1 does not apply to an employee who has 
reported or caused to be reported a violation . . . unless the employee has 
first brought the alleged violation, condition, or practice to the attention of 
a person having supervisory authority with the employer and has allowed 
the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct that violation, condition or 
practice.”). 
39. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 6C-1-8 (LexisNexis 2015) (“An employer 
shall post notices and use other appropriate means to notify employees and 
keep them informed of protections and obligations set forth in the provisions 
of this article.”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-2973(g) (Supp. 2015) (“Each state 
agency shall prominently post a copy of this act in locations where it can 
reasonably be expected to come to the attention of all employees of the state 
agency.”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:7 (2010) (“Every employer shall 
post such notices as are prescribed by the commissioner of labor as a means 
of keeping such employer’s employees informed of their protections and 
obligations under this chapter. The commissioner of labor shall adopt rules, 
under RSA 541-A, relative to the form, content, and placement of such 
notices.”). 
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collectively, whistleblower laws vary markedly and exist at the inter-
national, national, and local levels. 
Potential whistleblowers from within the intelligence community 
face additional procedural restrictions due to the sensitive nature of the 
information handled.40 In the United States, the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act,41 which governs whistleblower protections for federal employ-
ees, “expressly excluded intelligence agency employees from its applic-
ability.”42 To address this, Congress passed the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (“WPA”),43 which enabled 
employees of agencies “to report to Congress a matter of urgent con-
cern.”44 The protections for intelligence-community whistleblowers 
against retaliatory measures were further modified by Presidential 
Policy Directive 1945 and Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2014 (Title VI),46 which ostensibly protect intelligence-
community whistleblowers from reprisal.47 Collectively, the three mea-
sures protect certain forms of disclosures, but employees are rigidly 
constrained in available reporting channels.48 These reporting channels 
 
40. See G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 9 (“Some whistleblower 
protection laws expressly exclude . . . those in the intelligence services or the 
army[,]” while in several other countries, “public sector employees who are 
engaged in particularly sensitive areas of work may be subject to a special 
whistleblower protection legislation.”). 
41. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 
(1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C). 
42. Perry, supra note 20, at 1. 
43. Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2413 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C). 
44. Daniel D’Isidoro, Protecting Whistleblowers and Secrets in the Intelligence 
Community, Harv. Nat. Sec. J. (Sep. 29, 2014, 9:01 PM), http:// 
harvardnsj.org/2014/09/protecting-whistleblowers-and-secrets-in-the-
intelligence-community/ [https://perma.cc/TRM5-3REN]. 
45. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19: Protecting Whistleblowers with 
Access to Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012). 
46. Pub. L. No. 113-126, 128 Stat. 1390, 1414 (2014) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
47. Making Lawful Disclosures, Office of the Director of Nat’l 
Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about-this-site/contact-the-
ig/making-lawful-disclosures [https://perma.cc/QM2R-WGAC] (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2016). 
48. Mieke Eoyang, Should Intelligence Whistleblowers Be Protected?, The 
Atlantic (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2016/01/should-intelligence-whistleblowers-be-protected/424872/ [https:// 
perma.cc/674E-QVR6]. Unlike employees in “most agencies” who “can bring 
their concerns straight to the [congressional] committees[,]” intelligence-
community employees must first report to their agency Inspector General, 
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“do not include disclosures to media sources”49 and would not protect 
the government leakers under consideration in this Note. 
Despite the variations between statutes, a working definition of 
whistleblower can be ascertained through two analyses that compare 
best practices and common characteristics and, in one case, consider 
the unique circumstances of intelligence-community whistleblowers. 
The first of these two resources is the compendium of the best prac-
tices in whistleblower protection drafted by the G20 Anti-Corruption 
Working Group (“G20 Whistleblower Study”).50 In it, the Working 
Group identified several key characteristics common to whistleblowing: 
(1) “the disclosure of wrongdoings connected to the workplace”; (2) “a 
public interest dimension, e.g. the reporting of criminal offences, un-
ethical practices, etc., rather than a personal grievance”; and (3) “the 
reporting of wrongdoings through designated channels and/or desig-
nated persons.”51 The G20 list is generally applicable to all manner of 
whistleblowers within both the private and public spheres.  
Those three listed elements should be analyzed in conjunction with 
the more specific, intelligence-community whistleblower definitional 
components contained in the second resource, the Tshwane Principles.52 
The Tshwane Principles were a collaborative, two-year effort of twenty-
two groups and 500 experts, which provides “guidance to those engaged 
in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the 
state’s authority . . . to punish the disclosure of [national security] 
information.”53 The resulting comparison between the two resources 
reveals a working definition for intelligence-community whistleblowers 
that may prove sufficiently acceptable at the international level. 
 
“who forwards the complaint to the agency head, who decides whether to 
notify Congress.” Id. Intelligence-community employees “may contact the 
committees directly if the [Inspector General] overrules them or forwards 
incorrect information[,]” but even in that case “the employee must notify the 
agency head and abide by any security procedures the agency head imposes.” 
Id. 
49. Perry, supra note 20, at 1. 
50. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31. 
51. Id. ¶ 15.  
52. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 49–56. 
53. Id. at 5.  
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A. The Disclosure of Wrongdoings Connected to the Workplace 
The more general definition of wrongdoing offered in the G20 
Whistleblower Study is concise and does not add precise detail into 
what constitutes a “wrongdoing” that would merit disclosure.54  
For intelligence-community whistleblowers, a suspected wrong-
doing may range from trivial to treasonous in severity. Both the 
Whistleblower Protection Act and the Tshwane Principles offer broadly 
defined meanings for what constitutes a “wrongdoing” with several 
subcategories. The Whistleblower Protection Act protects employees 
who report an “urgent concern,” which includes a “false statement to 
Congress” as well as “a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of 
law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, adminis-
tration, or operations of an intelligence activity . . . but does not include 
differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.”55 The 
Tshwane Principles provide an 11-category list of wrongdoing 
characterized as a “protected disclosure” if revealed.56 The enumerated 
list includes criminal offenses, human rights and international humani-
tarian law violations, corruption, dangers to public health and safety, 
dangers to the environment, abuse of public office, miscarriages of 
justice, mismanagement or waste of resources, retaliation for disclosure 
of wrongdoing offenses, and “deliberate concealment of any matter 
falling into one of the above categories.”57  
One fear with such a broad definition is that it would allow low-
level employees to become “the ultimate arbiter of what is right and 
wrong” with a country’s policies.58 These low-level employees, notably 
Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, released records with which, 
in many cases, the “leakers admit to having had little or no famili-
arity.”59 That broad policy can place government employees with access 
 
54. See G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 9 (“Some countries set 
minimum thresholds on the extent of the wrongdoing before whistleblower 
protection may be triggered.”). 
55. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-272, § 702(a)(G)(i)(I)–(II), 112 Stat. 2413, 2415 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. §. 3517 (d)(5)(G)(i)(I)–(II) (2012)).  
56. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 49. 
57. Id. 
58. Steven Bucci, Edward Snowden Broke the Law: Opposing View, USA 
Today (June 10, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
opinion/2013/06/10/edward-snowden-heritage-foundation-editorials-debates/ 
2410213/ [https://perma.cc/7TRJ-Y3SF]. 
59. Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1387, 
1401 (2015). 
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to classified information in challenging situations to judge the 
constitutionality of employers’ behavior.60  
The examples provided, although expansive, give an indication of 
the types of employer or supervisor misconduct that prompt employees 
to report. The absence of narrowly tailored categories of wrongdoing is 
tempered, however, by the third element within the G20 Whistleblower 
Study—the use of internal, designated channels and personnel to receive 
whistleblowing complaints.61 Consequently, a broad meaning of wrong-
doing can encourage government employees to report all manner of sus-
picious activity, while the filtering mechanism of internal channels can 
forestall any deluge of complaints to outside third parties. 
B. A Public Interest Dimension, Such as “the Reporting of Criminal 
Offences, Unethical Practices, Rather Than a Personal Grievance” 
The motivation of a whistleblower in making a disclosure is a key 
concern for determining the level of protection merited. Especially as it 
pertains to government employees in possession of classified informa-
tion, the motivation may well prove the difference between a disclo-
sure’s characterization as whistleblowing or traitorous.62 
The G20 Whistleblower Study notes that “[a] principal requirement 
in most whistleblower protection legislation is that the disclosures be 
made in ‘good faith’ and on ‘reasonable grounds.’”63 In its guiding prin-
ciples, the study defines a “good faith” disclosure as a report made 
“based upon the individual’s reasonable belief that the information dis-
closed evidenced one of the identified conditions in the statute, even if 
 
60. PEN American Center, Secret Sources: Whistleblowers, national 
security, and Free Expression 13 (2015), http://www.pen 
.org/sites/default/files/Secret%20Sources%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BCZ8-S4WP] [hereinafter Secret Sources] (stating that the U.S. executive 
director for intelligence community whistleblowing explained that he would 
have told a pre-disclosure Snowden that it is “nice you think [the mass 
surveillance programs are] unconstitutional, but staking your career on your 
hypothetical opinion about constitutionality is very dangerous”). 
61. See infra Part I.C (discussing internal reporting channels). 
62. See Jo Becker, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, N.S.A. 
Contractor Arrested in Possible New Theft of Secrets, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/us/nsa-leak-booz-allen-
hamilton.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3ACL-KUL4] (stating that, while 
investigators did not think the investigation against arrested National 
Security Agency contractor Harold T. Martin looked “like a traditional 
espionage case,” an official noted that “investigators thought that [Mr. 
Martin] was not politically motivated—‘not like a Snowden or someone who 
believes that what we were doing was illegal and wanted to publicize that’”). 
63. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 8.  
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the individual’s belief is incorrect.”64 The activities disclosed should 
have a public interest basis, meaning the activities “threaten[] or pose[] 
a risk to others.”65 Conversely, a disclosure should not be motivated by 
a personal grievance, centered on “the staff member’s own employment 
position” and which has no bearing on others.66  
To that end, whistleblower protection laws afford no protection to 
individuals that make “false disclosures” even though many governing 
bodies overseeing whistleblowing disclosures “would normally not im-
pose sanctions for misguided reporting, and . . . disclosures that are 
made in honest error.”67 This conception is in line with the Tshwane 
Principles, which note that, as long as the disclosure relates to a listed 
wrongdoing and is not “knowingly untrue” when made, the motivation 
“is irrelevant.”68 Both definitions afford protection to good-faith dis-
closures of wrongdoing with a public interest dimension. 
In very high profile examples of public disclosures by intelligence-
community employees, the motivations appear to comport with this 
element. For example, Edward Snowden—in his own words—sought to 
“inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that 
which is done against them.”69 He did not appear to “possess a profit 
motive,” nor did he appear motivated by “personal gain or the gain of 
others.”70 Former NSA administrator Thomas Drake was motivated to 
disclose publicly his concerns that “the government’s eavesdroppers 
were squandering hundreds of millions of dollars on failed programs 
while ignoring a promising alternative.”71 Former CIA analyst John 
Kiriakou was driven to publicly disclose his “concerns about the [CIA’s] 
use of enhanced interrogation techniques and waterboarding.”72 In 
leaking hundreds of thousands of classified documents to WikiLeaks, 
 
64. Id. at 31.  
65. Frequently Asked Questions, NHS Employers (Nov. 4, 2014), http:// 
www.nhsemployers.org/case-studies-and-resources/2014/04/frequently-
asked-questions [https://perma.cc/WPT4-7BLF]. 
66. Id. 
67. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 8. 
68. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 50. 
69. Greenwald et al., supra note 4. 
70. Mark D. Kielsgard & Ken Gee-Kin Ip, Hong Kong’s Failure to Extradite 
Edward Snowden: More than Just a Technical Defect, 13 Rich. J. Global 
L. & Bus. 49, 62 (2014). 
71. Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to Press, N.Y. Times 
(June 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/ 
12leak.html [https://perma.cc/UK9G-RQMB].  
72. Secret Sources, supra note 60, at 13. 
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Chelsea Manning wished to “‘make the world a better place’ and spark 
a national debate over the military’s role in U.S. foreign policy.”73  
Though some analysts have warned that sanctioning public dis-
closure of classified materials could allow employees to “take it upon 
themselves to sabotage the programs they don’t like[,]”74 the moti-
vations of the intelligence-community leakers cited above comport to 
the public interest element of the G20 definition. Though many people 
“have more than one motivation to act[,]”75 the evidence indicates that 
the leakers profiled above were in large part motivated by public 
interest concerns—exposing government wrongdoing or waste affecting 
the nation as a whole.76 
C. Reporting of Wrongdoings through Designated Channels  
or Designated Persons 
One of the most challenging elements for potential intelligence-com-
munity whistleblowers to meet is the requirement that disclosures first 
proceed through designated channels or persons. A frequent complaint 
leveled against intelligence-community leakers disclosing mass surveill-
ance and enhanced interrogation programs to the press is that those 
employees who suspect wrongdoing have alternate, legitimate means to 
bring concerns to supervisors and Congress “without breaking the 
law.”77 
President Barack Obama remarked that “[t]here were other avenues 
available for someone [like Edward Snowden,] ‘whose conscience felt 
stirred.’”78 Indeed, Obama noted that he “signed an executive order 
well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that provided whistle-
blower protection to the intelligence community for the first time.”79 
 
73. Janet Reitman, Bradley Manning Explains His Motives, Rolling Stone 
(Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/bradley-
manning-explains-his-motives-20130228 [https://perma.cc/79D4-3UKX] 
(quoting from Manning’s 35-page statement). 
74. Jeffrey Toobin, Edward Snowden Is No Hero, The New Yorker (June 10, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/edward-
snowden-is-no-hero [https://perma.cc/YX34-KCG8]. 
75. Kwoka, supra note 59, at 1396. 
76. See Eoyang, supra note 48 (“Michael Horowitz, the IG for the Department 
of Justice, recently stated that 80 percent of whistleblowers are motivated 
to improve the system, not tear it down.”). 
77. Bucci, supra note 58.  
78. Madhani & Jackson, supra note 7. 
79. Editorial, Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. Times (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-
blower.html? [https://perma.cc/X8DL-ZAM6]. Hillary Clinton also argued 
that Snowden should have internally reported his concerns, suggesting that 
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The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 
moreover, provides that the whistleblower should “notify the agency 
head, through an Inspector General, before they can report an ‘urgent’ 
concern to a congressional intelligence committee.”80 If the prosecuted 
government leakers had an adequate internal channel to disclose con-
cerns, then whistleblower protection could be unwarranted in the event 
of public disclosure. 
However, though an internal channel exists statutorily, it may not 
be an effective means to counteract wrongdoing or the correcting office 
may have no interest in addressing the complaint. Though John 
Kiriakou chose not to use internal reporting mechanisms, he refrained 
because “he believed he ‘wouldn’t have gotten anywhere’ as his super-
iors and the congressional intelligence committees were already aware 
of the program.”81 Because the law did not provide an alternate channel 
for external disclosure, the U.S. government indicted Kiriakou after his 
disclosures to the press.82 
Thomas Drake took his concerns about the government’s eaves-
dropping programs “everywhere inside the secret world: to his bosses, 
to the agency’s inspector general, to the Defense Department’s inspec-
tor general and to the Congressional intelligence committees[,] [b]ut he 
felt his message was not getting through.”83 An investigation by the 
Inspector General’s (“IG”) office of the Department of Defense “sub-
stantially affirmed” Drake’s complaint and forwarded the findings to 
the House and Senate committees overseeing the NSA.84 Despite this, 
once the subject of his complaint was published in the New York Times, 
 
“[h]e could have gotten all of the protections of being a whistleblower.” Mark 
Hertsgaard, How the Pentagon Punished NSA Whistleblowers, The 
Guardian (May 22, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/may/22/how-pentagon-punished-nsa-whistleblowers [https:// 
perma.cc/V7WF-9ZNN]. 
80. Secret Sources, supra note 60, at 13; Intelligence Community Whistle-
blower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 702(a)(D)(i)–(ii), 112 
Stat. 2413, 2414 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3517 (d)(5)(D)(i)–(ii) 
(2012)). 
81. Secret Sources, supra note 60, at 13 (quoting Interview with John 
Kiriakou (Aug. 4, 2015)).  
82. Wolfe et al., supra note 21, at 59. 
83. Shane, supra note 71. When Drake “told his boss, Baginski, that the NSA’s 
expanded surveillance following 9/11 seemed legally dubious, she reportedly 
told him to drop the issue: the White House had ruled otherwise.” 
Hertsgaard, supra note 79.  
84. Hertsgaard, supra note 79. The whistleblower complaint joined by Drake 
“helped nudge Congress to end funding for” a wasteful government 
program named Trailblazer. Id. 
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senior Defense Department officials repeatedly broke the law to per-
secute Drake.85 These officials, according to John Crane, the former 
assistant inspector general at the IG’s office, “revealed Drake’s identity 
to the Justice Department[,] . . . withheld (and perhaps destroyed) 
evidence after Drake was indicted[, and then] lied about all this to a 
federal judge.”86 
Edward Snowden did not attempt to report within the designated 
channel, but there were valid reasons for his failure to disclose inter-
nally. If Snowden had attempted to raise his concerns with Congress or 
the NSA Inspector General, he may not have found a receptive audience 
because “differences of opinions concerning public policy matters” is not 
characterized as an “urgent concern” warranting public disclosure, and 
in any event, “the law would not have protected him from retaliatory 
employment action for having done so.”87 Moreover, Snowden was 
aware of the fate that befell Drake and the other potential intelligence-
community whistleblowers.88 Snowden characterized what he under-
stood to be the value of the NSA’s internal whistleblowing channels in 
the following critique: 
Name one whistleblower from the intelligence community whose 
disclosures led to real change—overturning laws, ending 
policies—who didn’t face retaliation as a result. The protections 
just aren’t there . . . . The sad reality of today’s policies is that 
going to the inspector general with evidence of truly serious 
wrongdoing is often a mistake.89 
Nevertheless, Snowden claims “he brought his misgivings to two su-
periors in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and two more in the NSA 
Threat Operations Center.”90 Faced with maintaining silence or sacri-
ficing his career without impacting the source of his concern, Snowden 
 
85. Id.  
86. Id. 
87. Secret Sources, supra note 60, at 15. 
88. See Hertsgaard, supra note 79 (quoting Snowden as remarking in 2015 that 
“[i]t’s fair to say that if there hadn’t been a Thomas Drake, there wouldn’t 
have been an Edward Snowden”). 
89. Id. 
90. Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says 
His Mission’s Accomplished, Wash. Post (Dec. 23, 2013), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-
months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/ 
49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ETQ-
FRED] (responding to critical accusations that he did not pursue internal 
channels of dissent, Snowden replied, “[h]ow is that not reporting it? How is 
that not raising it?”). 
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pursued a risky third alternative—public disclosure to the press. As he 
explained, “[g]oing to the press involves serious risks, but at least you’ve 
got a chance.”91 
Because an unauthorized disclosure “is ‘prohibited by law’ and will 
not be afforded whistleblower protection unless it is made to the 
agency’s Inspector General or the Office of Special Counsel[,]”92 
Snowden made arrangements to flee the country in advance of his 
public disclosure.93 Fully cognizant that prior whistleblowers often 
could not substantiate their allegations “because the government had 
classified all the evidence[,]” Snowden also “took the evidence with him” 
in the form of thousands of NSA documents.94 
Because not all internal channels for whistleblowing disclosures are 
sufficiently responsive, consideration of the reporting context must be 
afforded to whistleblowers who fail to follow or disregard the internal 
disclosure mandates of their employers and instead take their concerns 
to the media. The Tshwane Principles protects disclosures to the public 
in the following circumstances: 
[T]he body to which the disclosure was made refused or failed to 
investigate the disclosure effectively . . . [; or] [t]he person 
reasonably believed that there was a significant risk that making 
the disclosure internally . . . would have resulted in the 
destruction or concealment of evidence, interference with a 
witness, or retaliation against the person or a third party; [or] 
there was no established internal body or independent oversight 
body to which a disclosure could have been made.95 
An important caveat in the Tshwane Principles, however, is the 
requirement that the potential whistleblower “only disclose[] the 
amount of information that [is] reasonably necessary to bring to light 
the wrongdoing.”96 Critics of Snowden—even those that concede he 
performed a measure of public service in his disclosure—assert that his 
acts went beyond whistleblowing because a large portion of the material 
he stole and revealed compromised lawful, needed government pro-
grams.97 This was the opinion of the House Intelligence Committee, 
 
91. Hertsgaard, supra note 79. 
92. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31, at 10. 
93. Greenwald et al., supra note 4. 
94. Hertsgaard, supra note 79 (emphasis omitted). 
95. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 51–52. 
96. Id. at 52. 
97. See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, The Leaky Myths of Snowden, Slate (Sept. 16, 2016, 
4:40 PM), https://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_ 
stories/2016/09/what_snowden_gets_wrong_about_its_hero.html [https: 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
Are Intelligence-Community Leakers Internationally Protedcted 
Whistleblowers or Simply "Whistling in the Dark"? 
917 
which argued that “Snowden caused tremendous damage to national 
security, and the vast majority of the documents he stole have nothing 
to do with programs impacting individual privacy interests . . . .”98 
Snowden supporters counter that he took precautions to reveal only 
what was reasonably necessary, noting that “[i]nstead of dumping a 
mass of documents on the internet, he gave them to experienced na-
tional security reporters . . . . [and] relied on their judgments about 
what was in the public interest.”99 The fear that potential whistle-
blowers that go to the public may reveal too much is a legitimate 
concern. As explained by Michael Horowitz, the IG for the Department 
of Justice, “because normal whistleblower protections do not shield 
government employees who run straight to the media, those who do so 
may go for broke, taking as much information as possible.”100 
Governmental departments and agencies, especially those in the 
intelligence communities and others working with sensitive, classified 
information, should certainly have internal reporting channels that 
employees can resort to for whistleblowing disclosures. Nevertheless, 
those same governmental bodies should ensure that the internal bodies 
provide more than just superficial lip service to employee concerns. As 
the Tshwane Principles aptly describe, the internal body should 
“investigate the alleged wrongdoing and take prompt measures with a 
view to resolving the matters . . . [or] refer it to a body that is authorized 
 
//perma.cc/RHQ7-2CPW] (“The fact is, many of Snowden’s documents 
[that he seized] bore no resemblance to whistleblowing as the phrase is 
broadly understood.” Many of the activities revealed “are legitimate aspects of 
the NSA’s charter, which involves intercepting communications of foreign 
powers. They have nothing to do with domestic surveillance or spying on 
allies.”); Editorial, No Pardon for Edward Snowden, Wash. Post (Sept. 17, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/edward-snowden-doesnt-
deserve-a-pardon/2016/09/17/ec04d448-7c2e-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/KML5-MYRS] (“[Snowden] also pilfered, 
and leaked, information about a separate overseas NSA Internet-monitoring 
program, PRISM, that was both clearly legal and not clearly threatening to 
privacy . . . . Worse—far worse—he also leaked details of basically defensible 
international intelligence operations . . . .”). 
98. Intelligence Committee Executive Summary, supra note 3, at 1 
(emphasis omitted). 
99. Trevor Timm, The Washington Post Is Wrong: Edward Snowden Should Be 
Pardoned, The Guardian (Sept. 19, 2016, 4:28 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/19/washington-post-wrong-
edward-snowden-pardon [https://perma.cc/3NHB-HVW3]. Those reporters 
charged with filtering and disseminating Snowden’s documents “allowed the 
government to make objections (some of which they listened to) tied to 
national security concerns.” Id. 
100. Eoyang, supra note 48.  
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and competent to investigate.”101 If those elements are not present, 
governments should not retaliate against whistleblowers who reason-
ably perceive no option other than public disclosure. In providing this 
public reporting avenue, however, officials could then require a poten-
tial whistleblower to limit public disclosure to that necessary to expose 
the wrongdoing. 
II. Intelligence-Community Whistleblowers under 
Existing International Law  
The intelligence-community leakers described above failed to find 
protection under domestic whistleblowing legislation. Should those 
same leakers have found protection under international law? Edward 
Snowden is a useful test case to assess whether intelligence community 
whistleblowers qualify for protected status under existing international 
law. This is because, unlike the other intelligence-community leakers 
discussed previously, he escaped domestic law enforcement and sought 
the protection of the international community. 
Whistleblowers could conceivably find protection under inter-
national refugee law or asylum law. International refugee law is rooted 
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees102 and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.103 In asylum law—
which is customary international law and based on the principle of non-
refoulement—states may refuse to extradite asylees to a requesting 
state by citing a “political offence” exception, a component of almost 
every bilateral extradition treaty.104 A political offense exception in-
volves an act that is either “directed solely against the political order . 
. . [or] directed at both the political order and private rights.”105 
An analysis of both the Refugee Convention and asylum law reveals 
that a national security whistleblower’s status under either legal 
framework comes down to one essential question—does whistleblowing 
constitute a political act or political opinion? Persecution based on 
political belief stands as the only viable protected category within the 
definition of “refugee” that could widely apply to national security 
 
101. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 51. 
102. Refugee Convention, supra note 24. 
103. 1967 Protocol, supra note 25. 
104. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 741. 
105. Christine E. Cervasio, Comment, Extradition and the International Criminal 
Court: The Future of the Political Offense Doctrine, 11 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev. 419, 426 (1999). 
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whistleblowers under international refugee law.106 Because the political 
offense exception under asylum law considers whether an act was 
political in its effect and motivation, the key determining factor is the 
same under both legal frameworks. Answering whether intelligence-
community whistleblowing constitutes a political act will therefore 
determine what, if any, protections are afforded to those whistleblowers 
under current international law. 
Under both refugee law and the asylum law, it is the state in which 
the applicant applies for protection that determines the applicant’s 
potential refugee or asylee status. The Refugee Convention allows 
government officials in the state of application to determine refugee 
status,107 while under asylum law, the decision as to whether an act 
qualifies for the political offense exception is taken “unilaterally” by the 
state of application.108 Because the definitions of refugees or political 
offense asylees are vaguely written or entirely absent in some cases, the 
decisions are nearly always politically influenced and subject to state 
discretion.109 
A. Intelligence-Community Whistleblowers under Asylum Law 
Asylum law has ancient roots and entails the conditions “under 
which a foreign sovereign or religious order may accept a person seeking 
protection from persecution in his home country.”110 Asylum law is 
situated within the larger context of bilateral extradition agreements 
between states, which detail “the legal process by which a foreign coun-
try delivers a fleeing citizen to his home country upon request from the 
home country.”111 While extradition agreements are designed to “con-
tractually prevent” a treaty partner’s offer of asylum to the requesting 
 
106. See Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1(A)(2) (listing the categories 
protected under refugee law as “race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”). 
107. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶ 189. 
108. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 744. 
109. Id. (“[E]xtradition laws and treaties almost never define the term political 
offence, and consequently, the definition is unvariably a matter of judicial 
interpretation and administrative discretion.”); see also UNHCR Hand-
book, supra note 30, ¶ 191 (explaining that because refugee determination 
is left to the contracting states, the procedures utilized “vary considerably” 
from state to state.). 
110. Kendall, supra note 17, at 154 (citation omitted). 
111. Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 158 (noting that “the U.S. maintained 
extradition treaties with more than 100 countries including Australia, 
Ecuador, Spain, Canada, Colombia, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Liberia, 
and Iraq”). 
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state’s nationals,112 the political offense exception remains a commonly 
cited loophole. If an asylee can convince his host state that his alleged 
offense was political in nature, the state could resist an extradition 
request, even if an extradition treaty is in force.113 
The political offense exception is “one of the most universally 
accepted and one of the most universally contested rules of inter-
national law.”114 The political offense exception and asylum law gen-
erally remain in the exclusive purview of the specific states party to an 
extradition agreement,115 which has resulted in incongruous application 
internationally. Each country has developed its own conception of 
political offense “with the result that the question as to whether a crime 
is political or non-political may be differently answered from one state 
to another.”116 As with the international refugee law, a leaker’s pro-
tected status under asylum law will depend on whether intelligence 
community whistleblowing is viewed as a political act by the requested 
state. If so, that state could cite a political offense exception in resisting 
extradition. 
B. Intelligence Community Whistleblowers under the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
Though subject to state determination, refugee characteristics are 
nonetheless given a definition under the Refugee Convention.117 The 
Refugee Convention consolidates previous international agreements and 
international norms relating to refugees and “provides the most 
comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international 
level.”118 As of April 2015, there are 142 states party to both the original 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.119 Those qualifying as refugees 
 
112. Id. at 154. 
113. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 750–51 (noting that some extradition 
agreements now contain depolitization—essentially exceptions to the political 
offense exception—wherein “a given offence will not be considered political 
for the purposes of extradition”).  
114. Id. at 741. 
115. Id. at 744 (“[T]he decision as to whether or not a given offence qualifies 
as political is taken unilaterally by the requested State.”). 
116. Id. 
117. Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1(A). 
118. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note to Convention 
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 3 (2010), 
https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [https://perma.cc/SS62-HAMR]. 
119. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
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under the Refugee Convention cannot be forcefully “expel[led] or 
return[ed] . . . to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened.”120 If an intelligence-community whistleblower 
qualified as a refugee, a state would be precluded from expelling or 
returning him to his country of origin. 
The key question, then, is whether Snowden or other intelligence-
community leakers would qualify as refugees under the Refugee Con-
vention. Refugees are those possessing a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted [by their country of nationality] for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”121 The definition as it pertains to whistleblowers can be app-
roached by considering two factors: (1) the meaning and application of 
a “well-founded fear;” and (2) does an applicant fear “persecution” 
owing to one of the enumerated factors listed in the definition? 
1. Meaning and Application of Well-Founded Fear 
The key to determining whether an intelligence-community whistle-
blower could be subjected to persecution is a “well-founded fear.” There 
are two parts to this phrase—one being subjective and the other being 
an objective, reasonableness standard. As the UNHCR notes, “fear is 
subjective” and, as it will vary from person to person, a determination 
of a given refugee’s fear should be measured first by the applicant’s 
statement and frame of mind.122 People display and reveal fear in differ-
ent manners, and this subjective element must consider the applicant’s 
personal level of fear. 
The second component of the phrase is an objective, reasonableness 
standard. The applicant’s frame of mind must be supported by an 
objective situation—“[f]ear must be reasonable” and not “[e]xagger-
ated.”123 This part of determining an applicant’s fear should consider 
his background, personal experiences, and the situation in the country 
of origin. The UNHCR states that an applicant’s fear “should be 
considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that 
his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to 
him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same rea-
sons be intolerable if he returned there.”124 In determining whether an 
 
Protocol 1 (2008), https://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2BJU-9BDS]. 
120. Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 33(1). 
121. Id. at art. 1(A)(2). 
122. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶¶ 37–38. 
123. Id. ¶ 41. 
124. Id. ¶ 42. 
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applicant has well-founded fear, both the subjective and the objective 
elements must be met.125 
In the case of Edward Snowden, there was clear evidence of a sub-
jective fear on his part. When considering the U.S. government’s reac-
tion, Snowden remarked, “[y]es, I could be rendered by the CIA. I could 
have people come after me . . . that is a concern I will live with for the 
rest of my life, however long that happens to be.”126 Snowden’s fear is 
evidenced not only by his words, but by his actions. Glenn Greenwald 
noted that, while in his Hong Kong hotel room, Snowden “line[d] the 
door of his hotel room with pillows to prevent eavesdropping,” and put 
“a large red hood over his head and laptop when entering his passwords 
to prevent any hidden cameras from detecting them.”127 Snowden 
clearly met the subjective element, as his fear of U.S. government 
reprisal was evident to those around him. 
As far as the objective, reasonable element of the test, Snowden’s 
fear was well-founded. The United States had charged Snowden with 
three felonies, including two under the 1917 Espionage Act, which could 
send him to prison “for decades if not life upon conviction.”128 By 
revealing the classified information to the media, Snowden faced, at the 
minimum, an extensive prison sentence. This deprivation of liberty, 
whether justified or not, would certainly constitute a well-founded fear 
as it would be “intolerable” for Snowden to remain or return to the 
United States when facing the prison sentence. Snowden and other 
intelligence-community whistleblowers would likely meet the elements 
of the first factor and demonstrate a well-founded fear of U.S. govern-
ment reprisals. 
2. Does an Intelligence Community Whistleblower Fear “Persecution” 
Owing to One of the Enumerated Factors Listed in the Definition? 
To qualify as a refugee, Snowden would need to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution. Do the possible U.S. reprisals constitute persecution 
under the Refugee Convention, and is the alleged persecution tied to 
one of the factors listed within the Refugee Convention’s definition? 
Persecution has a potentially broad meaning. In the opinion of two 
noted scholars, the “core meaning” of persecution “readily includes the 
 
125. Id. ¶ 38. 
126. Greenwald et al., supra note 4. Snowden went so far as to speculate that 
the CIA could employ the Triads to seize him. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Glenn Greenwald, On the Espionage Act Charges Against Edward Snowden, 
The Guardian (June 22, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2013/jun/22/snowden-espionage-charges [https://perma.cc/ 
9TEH-YZGR]. 
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threat of deprivation of life or physical freedom.”129 This is a potentially 
expansive definition, but one that “remains very much a question of 
degree and proportion.”130 The deprivation of physical freedom that is 
the sine-qua-non of prison sentences could potentially constitute per-
secution if it was tied into the enumerated rationales listed within the 
Refugee Convention. 
For a prison sentence to constitute persecution under the Refugee 
Convention, it must be based on or the result of discrimination or mis-
treatment related to an applicant’s “race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion.”131 In the case of 
Snowden and other potential whistleblowers, the first three may be 
dispensed with quickly. Any potential persecution of Edward Snowden 
was not tied to his race, religion, or nationality. The prison sentence 
imposed by the U.S. government would result from Snowden’s seizure 
and disclosure of classified government documents. 
Snowden could assert that government whistleblowers are part of a 
particular social group, though such a conception is unlikely to gain 
traction within the international community. The UNHCR notes that 
“a ‘particular social group’ normally comprises persons of similar back-
ground, habits or social status” and “may be at the root of persecution 
because there is no confidence in the group’s loyalty to the Government 
or because the political outlook . . . of its members, or the very existence 
of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Govern-
ment’s policies.”132 From that broader definition, government whistle-
blowers could potentially qualify as a particular social group. The 
“members” of the group have a similar background as government em-
ployees with first-hand familiarity with the inner workings of the U.S. 
government. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the U.S. government 
might question the loyalty of government whistleblowers or consider 
the existence of the group as a threat to the government’s policies. 
Certainly, Snowden has been characterized as a traitor,133 and his 
 
129. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in Inter-
national Law 92 (2007). 
130. Id. 
131. Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 33(1). 
132. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶¶ 77–78. 
133. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Michael Hayden ‘Drifting’ Toward Calling Edward 
Snowden a ‘Traitor,’ Huffington Post (Dec. 29, 2013, 12:32 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/29/michael-hayden-edward-snowden_n 
_4515705.html [https://perma.cc/EP5T-DVK6] (quoting former Director of 
the NSA Michael Hayden, in describing Edward Snowden, as saying he is 
now “drifting in the direction of perhaps more harsh language . . . such as 
‘traitor’”). 
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disclosure of the inner-workings of the U.S. intelligence apparatus has 
been characterized as a threat to government security.134 
The key point against Snowden is that not all government whistle-
blowers fit within that category. The government encourages and re-
wards certain forms of whistleblowing against government miscon-
duct.135 However, perhaps the “particular social group” could be more 
narrowly defined as whistleblowers that expose misconduct within the 
classified intelligence community. A stronger case could be made for 
persecution of that group, as the Obama administration has conducted 
seven prosecutions of leakers under the Espionage Act, which is “more 
than double the number under all prior US presidents combined.”136 It 
may be possible to conceive of government whistleblowers that use 
classified materials to expose government misconduct as a social group. 
Nevertheless, intelligence-community whistleblowers would be un-
likely to prevail in arguments that their collective acts result in the 
creation of a social group in line with the Refugee Convention’s lan-
guage. In 2002, the UNHCR issued further guidance and a clarified 
definition of a particular social group as a “group of persons who share 
a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or 
who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often 
be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise funda-
mental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.”137 
 
134. See, e.g., John Bolton, Edward Snowden’s Leaks are a Grave Threat to US 
National Security, The Guardian (June 18, 2013), http://www. 
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/18/edward-snowden-leaks-grave-
threat [https://perma.cc/6JHH-FPPM] (comparing Snowden’s disclosures to 
“Benedict Arnold scheming to betray West Point’s defenses to the British”). 
135. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 
16, 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (recognizing 
that whistleblower disclosures can “serve the public interest by assisting in 
the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, and unnecessary Government 
expenditures”). 
136. Greenwald, supra note 128 (emphasis omitted). Taking a more combative 
stance than the previous administration, the Trump White House has 
vowed to more actively pursue and prosecute leakers from within the law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump 
Denounces F.B.I. Over Leaks, Demanding Investigation, N.Y. Times (Feb. 
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/trump-fbi-
leaks.html [https://perma.cc/XVJ6-JC5Z] (noting that “President Trump . 
. . assailed the F.B.I. as a dangerously porous agency, charging that leaks 
of classified information from within its ranks were putting the country at 
risk—and calling for an immediate hunt for the leakers”). 
137. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
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There are two steps within this definition to determine whether a 
refugee is a member of a particular social group under the Refugee 
Convention. One must first determine if the shared characteristic of the 
group is immutable—is it a feature that “cannot be changed” or, though 
possible to change, “ought not . . . be required to be changed because 
they are so closely linked to the identity of the person or are an express-
ion of fundamental human rights.”138 The second step is to consider 
whether the group is “socially perceived and cognizable.”139 
The first step can be dealt with swiftly—it would be a great leap 
to consider government whistleblowing an immutable characteristic 
that is “linked to the identity of the person.”140 The UNHCR Social 
Group Guidelines did note that shopkeepers or members of a particular 
profession might constitute a particular social group “if in the society 
they are recognized as a group which sets them apart.”141 The govern-
ment whistleblowers have certainly garnered a great deal of public 
attention and media reports have occasionally linked intelligence-
community whistleblowers together.142 Yet it is unlikely that society 
sees these whistleblowers within the intelligence community as a distin-
ct, cognizable group.143 Because of the unlikelihood that intelligence-
 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) 
[hereinafter UNHCR Social Group Guidelines]. 
138. Id. ¶ 12. 
139. Isaac T.R. Smith, Note, Searching for Consistency in Asylum’s Protected 
Grounds, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1891, 1893 (2015) (citation omitted). 
140. UNHCR Social Group Guidelines, supra note 137, ¶ 12. 
141. Id. ¶ 13 (noting that shopkeepers or other members of a particular profession 
might then constitute a particular group even if “it were determined that 
owning a shop or participating in a certain occupation in a particular society 
is neither unchangeable nor a fundamental aspect of human identity”). 
142. See e.g., Mark Bowden, What Snowden and Manning Don’t Understand 
About Secrecy, The Atlantic (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/what-snowden-and-manning-
dont-understand-about-secrecy/278973/ [https://perma.cc/VR3N-C4XD] 
(discussing the Snowden and Manning cases); Lauren Walker, Glen 
Greenwald: Why Americans Prefer Edward Snowden to Chelsea Manning, 
Newsweek (July 20, 2015, 4:07 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/glenn-
greenwald-why-americans-prefer-edward-snowden-chelsea-manning-355644 
[https://perma.cc/4FQ9-7ART] (contrasting Snowden with Manning); 
Slavoj Žižek, Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning and Julian Assange: Our 
New Heroes, The Guardian (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/03/snowden-manning-assange-new-heroes 
[https://perma.cc/SQ5R-BVRA] (grouping Snowden together with Chelsea 
Manning and Julian Assange). 
143. See UNHCR Social Group Guidelines, supra note 137, ¶ 13 (recognizing 
that “a particular profession might nonetheless constitute a particular social 
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community whistleblowers constitute a particular social group, their 
protected status under international refugee law hinges on whether 
intelligence-community whistleblowing constitutes a political act or 
political opinion that forms the basis for persecution. 
C. Is Intelligence-Community Whistleblowing a Political Act? 
Under both asylum and refugee law, the protected status of an 
intelligence-community whistleblower will depend on whether the re-
quested state deems the whistleblowing a political act. 
A “political offense” has important ramifications under both the 
Refugee Convention and asylum law more generally. Under the Refugee 
Convention, the UNHCR explains that, in determining whether perse-
cution is based on political opinion, the following elements should be 
considered: “personality of the applicant, his political opinion, the mo-
tive behind the act, the nature of the act committed, the nature of the 
prosecution and its motives . . . [and] the nature of the law on which 
the prosecution is based.”144 
In asylum law, by comparison, two important models emerge in 
considering the political offense exception. The first is the political in-
cidence theory, followed by the United States and the United King-
dom.145 In order to qualify as a political act, it “must be part of and 
incidental to a political struggle.”146 Intelligence-community whistle-
blowing would not qualify as a political act under such a theory, as 
“[t]here is no ongoing uprising taking place in the U.S., only disparate 
political rhetoric . . . .”147 The other model is the proportionality theory. 
Under this Swiss-developed model, the whistleblowing “should be part 
of [or] linked with a political conflict situation [and] there should be a 
commensurateness between the act and the political objective of the 
act.”148 Under this approach, the criminal nature of the act should be 
directly compared to its political objective. Extremely serious offenses, 
such as murder, “usually do not satisfy this criterion,” while “purely 
political” crimes, which are not common crimes and do not injure pri-
vate persons, property, or interests would always satisfy such a test.149 
 
group if in the society they are recognized as a group which sets them 
apart”). 
144. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶ 86. 
145. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 746. 
146. Id. (citing as an example the attempted murder of a British soldier in 
Northern Ireland by a member of the IRA, which was connected to the 
overall conflict in Northern Ireland). 
147. Kielsgard & Gee-Kin Ip, supra note 70, at 64. 
148. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 748. 
149. Id. at 745, 748. 
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Intelligence-community whistleblowing would fall somewhere in be-
tween the two extremes of “serious” and “purely political” crimes. 
Intelligence-community whistleblowing could potentially constitute 
a political offense under asylum law and possibly an act leading to per-
secution due to political opinion, which is protected under international 
refugee law.150 Again, a substantial obstacle to any consensus being 
reached is the state-to-state variations in determining a political offe-
nse. International political pressures, economic ties and the economic 
or political superiority of the requesting state can all influence a state’s 
decision to grant or deny refugee or asylee status.151 Because of the 
individualized decision-making process under both legal frameworks, a 
clear answer to whether intelligence-community whistleblowing consti-
tutes a political act is elusive. 
If we look to the personality, political opinion, and motive behind 
the act, we find some indications for why intelligence-community leak-
ers disclosed the confidential information. Snowden explained that he 
was “willing to sacrifice all of that [career, salary, home, and family] 
because I can’t in good conscience allow the US government to destroy 
privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties for people around the world 
with this massive surveillance machine they’re secretly building.”152 
Chelsea Manning chose to release documents that “would ‘embarrass’ 
the country, notably the roughly 250,000 diplomatic cables revealing 
‘back room deals’ that ‘did not seem characteristic [of a country that 
was] so-called leader of the free world.’”153 Thomas Drake’s motivations 
were arguably political in nature, focused on “what he viewed as [the 
NSA’s] mistaken decisions on costly technology programs.”154 The 
UNHCR cautions against reading the phrase “political opinion” too 
literally as “it may not always be possible to establish a causal link 
between the opinion expressed and the related measures suffered or 
feared by the applicant [as] [s]uch measures have only rarely been based 
expressly on ‘opinion.’”155 Nevertheless, there are some clear political 
motivations behind many of the intelligence-community leakers’ dis-
closures. 
 
150. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶¶ 80–86 (outlining the circum-
stances under which persecution against political opinion can result in 
refugee status).  
151. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 26, at 749–50. 
152. Greenwald et al., supra note 4. 
153. Reitman, supra note 73. 
154. Shane, supra note 71. 
155. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30, ¶ 81. 
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There is some precedent within the U.S. court system that whistle-
blowing against a government official may constitute “political act-
ivity.” The Ninth Circuit in Grava v. INS,156 though cautioning that 
whistleblowing is “not, as a matter of law, always an exercise of political 
opinion,” when targeted against corrupt government officials, “it may 
constitute political activity sufficient to form the basis of persecution 
on account of political opinion.”157  
There is also some indication that the prosecutions of intelligence-
community leakers are overzealous and selectively enforced. A former 
CIA officer noted that the prosecution of John Kiriakou “seems dis-
proportionate and more like persecution. There appears to be a vin-
dictiveness about this.”158 Chelsea Manning was originally sentenced to 
a 35-year military prison sentence, which included lengthy stays in 
solitary confinement.159 Facing indictment, Thomas Drake was forced 
from two teaching jobs before landing at an Apple computer store as 
he prepared his defense.160 The ardent prosecution of intelligence-
community leakers who release information to expose perceived govern-
ment wrongdoing is all the more striking when compared to lenient 
treatment afforded to former four-star general David Petraeus, who 
gave classified information to his girlfriend and without a public interest 
motivation.161 Unlike John Kiriakou, who served prison time, Petraeus 
received “a slap on the wrist” by pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, 
 
156. 205 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000). 
157. Id. at 1181 (citing Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 
1999)). 
158. Steve Coll, The Spy Who Said Too Much: Why the Administration Targeted 
a C.I.A. Officer, The New Yorker (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.newyorker 
.com/magazine/2013/04/01/the-spy-who-said-too-much [https://perma.cc/ 
PXZ2-UB8G]. 
159. Conor Friedersdorf, The Persecution of Chelsea Manning, The Atlantic 
(Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/ 
08/the-ongoing-persecution-of-chelsea-manning/401195/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VXG5-GAKT]. At the close of his presidency in early 2017, President 
Obama “commuted all but four months of the remaining prison sentence” 
of Manning. See Charlie Savage, Chelsea Manning to be Released Early as 
Obama Commutes Sentence, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/obama-commutes-bulk-of-chelsea-
mannings-sentence.html [https://perma.cc/6CMT-SJQJ] (reporting that 
Manning is set to be freed on May 17, 2017). 
160. Shane, supra note 71. 
161. Andrew C. McCarthy, Petraeus is Protected by a Politicized Justice 
Department, Nat’l Review (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.nationalreview 
.com/article/414888/petraeus-protected-politicized-justice-department-
andrew-c-mccarthy [https://perma.cc/QGM7-7WAU]. 
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which carries only probation time and a fine.162 The implication of such 
disparate treatment is that there is “one set of rules for government 
insiders like Petraeus” and another—“law as a weapon—for use against 
Obama’s political detractors and scapegoats.”163 
III. Measures to Improve Protection of  
Intelligence-Community Whistleblowers 
The preceding discussions reveal shortcomings in the protection 
afforded to intelligence-community whistleblowers at both the domestic 
and international levels. Alterations to the existing frameworks would 
allow for more transparency within governments and increased safe-
guards for intelligence-community employees wishing to report and cor-
rect misconduct. The alterations can be grouped into two layers of pro-
tection: (A) front-end, or domestic protections and (B) back-end, or 
international protections. 
A. Alterations to Domestic Law Whistleblower Protections 
Domestic whistleblower protections for intelligence-community 
employees should be upgraded. Nowhere is this truer than in the United 
States. In the minds of many employees, safeguards and incentives are 
missing—“CIA employees have witnessed torturing colleagues in the 
agency get away with their crimes[, but] [t]hey’ve watched Kiriakou go 
to jail after objecting to torture.”164 As Snowden described, “[w]hen I 
was at NSA, everybody knew that for anything more serious than 
workplace harassment, going through the official process was a career-
ender at best. It’s part of the culture . . . .”165 Snowden offers a broadly 
 
162. Id. (noting that, absent a plea, Petraeus “should have been charged in a 
multi-count indictment”). 
163. Id. 
164. Conor Friedersdorf, Why Intelligence Whistleblowers Can’t Use Internal 
Channels, The Atlantic (July 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/07/whyintelligencewhistleblowerscantrelyoninternalc
hannels/375127/ [https://perma.cc/8B7Q-VPR5] (“Now, in the unlikely 
event that they weren’t previously aware of it, they’ve been put on notice 
that if they engage in whistleblowing through internal channels, during the 
course of a Senate investigation into past illegal behavior by the CIA, even 
then the protections theoretically owed them are little more than an 
illusion.”). 
165. Spencer Ackerman & Ewen MacAskill, Snowden Calls for Whistleblower 
Shield after Claims by New Pentagon Source, The Guardian (May 22, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/22/snowden-
whistleblower-protections-john-crane [https://perma.cc/397C-6SPZ].  
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described solution—“iron-clad, enforceable protections for whistle-
blowers and . . . a public record of success stories”166—but the essential 
measures needed are more direct whistleblower access to Congress or 
an independently created body to handle complaints and an option for 
whistleblowers to go public if internal reporting mechanisms fail. 
 Domestic whistleblower legislation should first establish a body 
with greater independence from the executive branch to handle whistle-
blower complaints. This recommendation is supported by the Tshwane 
Principles, which suggests that “[s]tates . . . establish or identify 
independent bodies to receive and investigate protected disclosures . . . 
[which] should be institutionally and operationally independent from 
the security sector and other authorities from which disclosures may be 
made, including the executive branch.”167 While initial reporting within 
the Executive Branch may be appropriate, employees need an alternate, 
independent body available to them for reporting. 
As it currently stands in the United States, whistleblower laws 
within the intelligence community allow the Inspectors General to 
“filter, and even block, reports to Congress from national security 
whistleblowers.”168 Employees may make reports to the Congressional 
intelligence committees, but must first give notice to the Director, 
through the Inspector General, of their intent to contact the committee 
and do so only “through the [Inspector General’s] direction on how to 
contact the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
security practices.”169  
Daniel D’Isidoro suggests creating an Office of Special Counsel of 
the Intelligence Community to advocate for whistleblowers and “help 
them navigate the proper procedures in reporting waste, fraud, abuse, 
or reprisal.”170 Placement within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence would “allow the office to remain independent from the 
individual agencies’ activities and pressures.”171 However, it would still 
remain in the Executive Branch, and as stated by Richard Moberly, 
“cannot be the only option” because it would be “subject to the 
 
166. Id. 
167. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 50. 
168. Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National 
Security Dilemma, 16 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 51, 123 (2012) (citations 
omitted). 
169. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-272, § 702(a)(D)(ii), 112 Stat. 2413, 2414 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii) (Supp. II Vol. III 2013–2015)).  
170. D’Isidoro, supra note 44. 
171. Id. 
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ultimate control of the executive branch.”172 Intelligence-community 
whistleblowers should be able to report to a body firmly outside of the 
administration. 
With that in mind, the most feasible solution for the intelligence-
community employees in the United States is to have greater access to 
Congress. D’Isidoro suggests allowing an employee to “submit his 
complaint to the intelligence committees concurrently with submitting 
the complaint to the Inspector General.”173 D’Isidoro, however, reserves 
this measure for “emergencies.”174 Moberly goes further and advises that 
“Congress needs direct, unfiltered reports from national security 
whistleblowers if the executive branch does not resolve problems iden-
tified by whistleblowers.”175 The approach highlighted by Moberly be-
tter moves whistleblower protection forward by allowing for reporting 
to an independent body outside the control of the executive branch. 
Greater measures should also be taken by Congress to protect the 
identities of whistleblowers. This is especially pressing given the news 
that the CIA “obtained a confidential email to Congress about alleged 
whistleblower retaliation related to the Senate’s classified report on the 
agency’s harsh interrogation program.”176 Questions about the security 
of communications with oversight bodies will do nothing to alleviate 
the “lack of faith”177 in the government’s official whistleblower channels. 
 Public disclosure should be retained as an option for intelligence-
community whistleblowers if the internal mechanisms for disclosure 
have been exhausted, but with a high threshold to meet. Michael Scharf 
and Colin McLaughlin suggest allowing an employee to disclose to the 
media if she “(1) has a reasonably good faith belief that her allegations 
are accurate and that disclosure is necessary to avoid serious harm; (2) 
has exhausted internal procedures unless she reasonably believes that 
disclosure would subject her to retaliation, or that the employer would 
conceal or destroy the evidence if alerted; and (3) publicly identifies 
herself as the source of the information.”178  
 
172. Moberly, supra note 168, at 124 (emphasis omitted). 
173. D’Isidoro, supra note 44. 
174. Id. 
175. Moberly, supra note 168, at 125. 
176. Marisa Taylor & Jonathan S. Landay, After CIA Gets Secret Whistlebower 
Email, Congress Worries About More Spying, McClatchy DC (July 25, 
2014, 3:08 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nationworld/national 
/nationalsecurity/article24771052.html [https://perma.cc/CB6Y-3UFT0]. 
177. Ackerman & MacAskill, supra note 165. 
178. Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and 
Whistleblowing, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 567, 579–580 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
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 Such an approach would allow for public disclosure in the event of 
institutional failure to address misconduct or illegality, while requiring 
the release of the whistleblower’s name if he or she decides to go public. 
The ability to attach a name and face to the leaked information is 
critical to establishing the credibility of both the source (and their 
motivations) and the revelations. This is evident when comparing the 
approach of Edward Snowden, who publicly revealed himself, with the 
anonymous hacker that provided stolen CIA documents to WikiLeaks 
in March of 2017.179 While Snowden was able to “make his case directly 
to the public” and start a conversation that “influenced both public 
policy and the law,” the lingering questions surrounding the motiva-
tions and identify of the WikiLeaks source will likely prevent any sim-
ilar debate over the scale and “acceptable limits of CIA spying ac-
tivities.”180 
 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to formulating any intelligence-
community whistleblowing policy allowing for public disclosure is deter-
mining the legally acceptable scale and scope of released information. 
The Tshwane Principles, for instance, would limit allowable public dis-
closure to the “amount of information that [is] reasonably necessary to 
bring to light the wrongdoing.”181 There is no definite answer, however, 
as to what constitutes a “reasonably necessary” amount of information 
in such circumstances and how an intelligence-community whistle-
blower could determine that amount.  
 Richard Moberly suggests “limiting the disclosures to information 
that should not have been classified in the first place because it covered 
up illegality . . .”182 While it is true that, in the opinion of several 
experts, the United States “classifies way too much information,”183 it 
 
179. See Sue Halpern, The Assange Distraction, N.Y. Rev. Books: NYR Daily 
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/03/15/ 
assange-distraction-wikileaks-cia/ [https://perma.cc/C78Z-U9UV] (discussing 
the WikiLeaks “release of a portion of . . . [a] trove of classified CIA 
documents . . . [revealing] actual programs designed to infect, disable, or take 
over any number of digital devices”). 
180. Id. (arguing that “[a]s long as the public believes that WikiLeaks is working 
in concert with the Russians to undermine faith in American institutions, or 
on its own to support the Trump agenda . . . there will be no debate over 
the CIA’s development and deployment of cyber-weapons”). 
181. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32, at 52. 
182. Moberly, supra note 168, at 139. 
183. Tom Blanton, Editorial, America Classifies Way Too Much Information—
and We are All Less Safe for It, Wash. Post. (July 31, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-is-not-safer-
when-its-citizens-are-left-in-the-dark/2015/07/31/641b53fa-36e2-11e5-b673-
1df005a0fb28_story.html?utm_term=.13711e6bda54 [https://perma 
.cc/6DC8-7DM3] (noting that Ronald Reagan’s former executive secretary 
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would be a daunting task for a potential whistleblower to determine the 
appropriate classification or the legality of acts or policies within ma-
terials in advance of public disclosure. At a minimum, whistleblowers 
should remove “personal identifiers and other potentially harmful infor-
mation” that is unnecessary to establishing the alleged misconduct.184 
Though maligned by some critics for absconding with too much infor-
mation, the process employed by Edward Snowden to sort out what 
information to disclose may in fact be the most practical. Snowden 
removed himself from that determination process and instead “provided 
a set of documents to several journalists and asked that [they] make 
careful judgments about what should and should not be published based 
on several criteria.”185 Although challenging to devise, providing some 
guidelines to potential intelligence-community whistleblowers on the 
legally acceptable scale and scope of publicly released information is 
essential. Such protocol would allow for the possibility of public dis-
closure in cases of institutional failure, but otherwise eliminate whistle-
blower protections for those employees that recklessly disclose excess 
information. 
B. Alterations to International Law Whistleblower Protections 
The back-end, or international approaches, would be activated in 
the event that intelligence-community leakers were denied due protec-
tion under domestic whistleblower law. There are two possible avenues 
to enhance intelligence-community whistleblower protection at the in-
ternational level. 
The first, more ambitious approach would focus on the creation of 
a new international instrument such as a treaty or convention. The 
proposed Snowden Treaty186 is an intriguing first step put forth by 
advocates of intelligence community whistleblowers. The proposed 
International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against 
Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers, or “Snowden 
Treaty” as it has been described by its backers, is an alteration to the 
international asylum law framework that, in part, addresses the legal 
 
for the National Security Council claimed 90 percent of “how much gets 
classified doesn’t deserve to be”). 
184. Halpern, supra note 179 (indicating that the author “once came across 
Bill Clinton’s home phone number in a WikiLeaks file”). 
185. Glenn Greenwald, Some Facts about How NSA Stories are Reported, The 
Intercept (Mar. 23, 2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/03/23/facts-
nsa-stories-reported/ [https://perma.cc/XUL2-QTZ4] (stating that 
“[p]ublication of an NSA story constitutes an editorial judgment by the 
media outlet that the information should be public”) (emphasis original). 
186. The Snowden Treaty, supra note 28.  
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status of those who characterize their actions as “whistleblowing.”187 
The law, as officially described, would stipulate that “[w]histleblowers 
will not be subject to sanctions for publicly releasing information with 
the reasonable intent of exposing wrongdoing” and also “commits 
signatories to . . . guarantee the right of residence in their countries and 
embassies for people claiming to be persecuted as whistleblowers until 
the appropriate proceedings for permanent asylum have been carried 
out in full.”188 The Snowden Treaty’s provisions for an international 
right to digital privacy and a global ban on mass intelligence-gathering 
programs may not be plausible189 or even necessary.190 Its proposals for 
increased whistleblower protection holds some promise, but may con-
tain flaws that preclude widespread acceptance by the international 
community.191 
A slightly less ambitious model would involve creating a govern-
ment whistleblowing protocol, which would add a defined “government 
whistleblower” category to those protected under the 1951 Con-
vention,192 which would afford protection to those fearing persecution 
because of actions that exposed government misconduct. Such a pro-
tocol could include a third-party adjudicator, such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, to decide the status of gov-
ernment whistleblowers.193 A neutral arbiter could solve the common  
187. Id.  
188. Id.  
189. Marko Milanovic, The World Doesn’t Need a “Snowden Treaty,” Just 
Security (Oct. 21, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
26984/world-doesnt-snowden-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/ART3-Q33W] (“It 
seems completely fanciful that any of the major players engaged in some 
type of mass surveillance (e.g., the US, the UK, Russia, or China), not to 
mention authoritarian regimes in many smaller states that are doing 
surveillance on the cheap, would ever agree to any such treaty.”). 
190. See id. (noting that there are already widely accepted human rights 
conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, that protect the right to privacy). 
191. See id. (arguing that the U.S. is particularly unlikely to ever ratify such a 
treaty because, in part, “even treaties that bring much more obvious benefits 
and little if any costs to the US, such as the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child or the Law of the Sea Convention,” have not been ratified).  
192. Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 1(A)(2). 
193. Third-party adjudicators have frequently been utilized in settling whistle-
blower disputes at the national level. For instance, the use of an independent 
third-party to settle whistleblower disputes “is contemplated as a normal 
option to resolve retaliation cases in the U.S. Whistleblower Protection Act.” 
Tom Devine, International Best Practices for Whistleblower Policies, Gov’t 
Accountability Project (Nov. 25, 2015), https:// 
www.whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/International%20Whistleblower
%20Best%20Practices%2011%2025%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2CY-
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diplomatic and political influence that plagues the refugee deter-
mination process and prevents consistent application of refugee and 
asylum law. 
Both of these options would face steep obstacles to gaining wide-
spread acceptance. First, international treaties take time to implement 
and the United States, in particular, is hesitant to ratify any treaty 
that is perceived to potentially impact its national interests.194 Second, 
even if an international agreement was created, international laws “take 
effect only through the actions of individual sovereign states.”195 The 
United States would have to implement the provisions of any inter-
national covenant and “[s]tates themselves have to consent to be en-
forced upon . . . .”196 It is unlikely that a large number of world powers 
would relinquish claims to prosecute leakers of classified information. 
Though a neutral arbiter would go far toward removing the political 
influences that plague the determination of refugee and asylum status, 
such a measure is unlikely because it would require “exclusive or 
appellate jurisdiction over such matters,”197 which again would require 
a new convention or protocol to create such jurisdiction. For these 
reasons, a new international instrument to provide enhanced protection 
for intelligence-community whistleblowers is unlikely to gain much 
traction, at least initially. 
For that reason, a second, more modest approach would be more 
feasible. Such an approach would work within the existing international 
conventions as written. Under this second scenario, the UNHCR would 
adjust the guidelines and handbook198 to recommend clearer and 
 
CSAN] (“Third party dispute resolution can be an expedited, less costly 
forum for whistleblowers. For example, labor-management arbitrations have 
been highly effective when the parties share costs and select the decision-
maker by mutual consent through a ‘strike’ process.”). 
194. Why Won’t America Ratify the UN Convention on Children’s Rights?, The 
Economist (Oct. 6, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/economist-explains/2013/10/economist-explains-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
U3SF-RLVU] (noting that the only countries unwilling to sign the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child are Somalia, South Sudan, and the 
United States). 
195. Hannah Chang, A ‘Legally Binding’ Climate Agreement: What Does it 
Mean? Why Does it Matter?, State of the Planet (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2010/02/23/a-%E2%80%9Clegally-binding% 
E2%80%9D-climate-agreement-what-does-it-mean-why-does-it-matter/ 
[https://perma.cc/VLU6-YSSE]. 
196. Id. 
197. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political 
Offenses Exception in Extradition—A Proposed Juridical Standard for an 
Unruly Problem, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 217, 257 (1969). 
198. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 30. 
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enhanced protections for a narrowly-defined set of government whistle-
blowers under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Judicial 
bodies within each state would then have clearer guidance that 
intelligence-community whistleblowing may qualify a claimant for 
refugee status under the proper conditions as modeled on the Tshwane 
Principles.199 
This second approach would also consist of intensive encourage-
ment of states to adopt domestic legislation modeled on the whistle-
blower guidelines of the G20 Whistleblower Study200 and the more 
narrowly tailored Tshwane Principles.201 Lastly, the new guidelines 
would require that the judiciary, not the executive, determine the re-
fugee or asylee status of applicants. Although extradition itself “is a 
prerogative of the government,” the judiciary should, according to Paul 
Gully-Hart, “examine the legal requirements set forth in the treaty or 
in domestic legislation.”202 A judicial body will help to prevent political 
concerns from becoming the overwhelming factor in determining 
whether a whistleblower applicant qualifies for refugee or asylee status. 
Conclusion: The Value of Whistleblowers in the 
Intelligence Community  
The international community should strive to improve whistle-
blower protections for intelligence-community employees at both the 
domestic and international level. The need for secure internal reporting 
channels and clear guidelines on appropriate timing and methods for 
disclosing to the media is apparent from the heated discussion on the 
legacy of Edward Snowden. Because Snowden found whistleblower pro-
tections for U.S. intelligience-community employees to be insufficient, 
he took steps to seize and disclose classified documents publicly, with-
out the benefit of knowing what or how much to disclose. Improving 
the domestic and international legal protections afforded to whistle-
blowers will serve the public interest while limiting mass leaks of class-
ified state secrets. 
Even Edward Snowden’s detractors concede that his disclosures 
provided some public benefit.203 Snowden’s leaks “launch[ed] an ongoing 
 
199. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32. 
200. G20 Whistleblower Study, supra note 31. 
201. Tshwane Principles, supra note 32. 
202. Paul Gully-Hart, The European Approach to Extradition, in International 
Criminal Law: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement 
Mechanisms 343, 371 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d. ed. 2008). 
203. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 97 (recognizing that “some of [Snowden’s] 
leaks did have social and political benefits”); Editorial, supra note 97 (noting 
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national debate about the NSA’s proper role in private affairs [and] 
[c]oncern about these activities was so great that President Obama 
appointed a panel of advisors to study NSA surveillance, which ul-
timately recommended strictly curtailing the NSA’s ability to engage 
in warrantless data collection.”204 Many credit Snowden with 
heightened public awareness of digital privacy issues205 and increased 
judicial scrutiny of government intelligence-gathering tactics.206 Most 
commentators will concede that there was a benefit to the public that 
came from Snowden’s disclsoures. 
There are lingering questions, however, as to the potential cost. 
Many allege that Snowden released far too much information that ex-
posed lawful, essential government programs.207 The House Intelligence 
Committee alleges that “[s]ome of Snowden’s disclosures exacerbated 
and accelarated existing trends that diminished the [intelligence 
community’s] capabilities to collect against legitimate foreign intelli-
gence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence streams 
that had saved American lives.”208 While defenders contend that any 
 
that “[i]t’s fair to say we owe these necessary reforms [of NSA programs] to 
Mr. Snowden”). 
204. Kwoka, supra note 59, at 1407 (citations omitted). 
205. See, e.g., Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-
Snowden, Pew Research Ctr. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-snowden/ 
[https://perma.cc/XD6M-5JWY] (finding that 30% of all adults “have taken 
at least one step to hide or shield their information from the government” and 
22% of all adults say “they have changed the patterns of their own use of 
various technological platforms ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ since the Snowden 
revelations”). 
206. See Trevor Timm, The Snowden Effect: New Privacy Wins Await After Data 
Transfer Ruling, The Guardian (Oct. 8 2015), https://www. 
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/08/snowden-effect-new-privacy-
wins-data-transfer-ruling [https://perma.cc/GR5R-37NU] (“[O]ur digital 
rights is [sic] unquestionably more protected than it was when the leaks 
started. And with the coming court cases over the next year or two, the 
seismic shift will undoubtedly continue to occur.”). 
207. See, e.g., David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with 
Barack Obama, The New Yorker (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick [https:// 
perma.cc/HJF4-EF57] (reporting that President Obama described Snowden 
as a “twenty-nine-year-old [who ended up having] free rein to basically dump 
a mountain of information, much of which is definitely legal, definitely 
necessary for national security, and [is] properly . . . classified[.]”). 
208. Intelligence Committee Executive Summary, supra note 3, at 1. 
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damage done by Snowden’s disclosures is overblown209 or greatly out-
weighed by the benefit,210 his critics charge that his acts have benefited 
terrorist organizations211 and cost lives and money.212 
Improvements to domestic and international whistleblower pro-
tection may allow societies to benefit from good-faith disclosures while 
avoiding the drawbacks cited by Snowden detractors. States should 
implement effective internal reporting channels and allow whistle-
blowers direct access to independent oversight bodies. Public disclo-
sures should also be permitted to whistleblowers in the event an internal 
reporting channel fails, but with clearly communicated limitations on 
when such disclosure is appropriate and how much material may be 
released to the public. Upgraded reporting mechanisms and greater 
protections for intelligence-community whistleblowers would alert the 
 
209. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Michael S. Schmidt, Qaeda Plot Leak Has 
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intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/TQ9L-27GF] (“[S]ome government 
analysts and senior officials have made a startling finding: the impact of a 
leaked terrorist plot by Al Qaeda in August has caused more immediate 
damage to American counterterrorism efforts than the thousands of classified 
documents disclosed by Edward Snowden . . . .”). 
210. Gellman, supra note 3 (“I believe Snowden’s disclosures did a lot more 
good than harm, but I do not share the view of some of his fans that he 
did no damage at all.”). 
211. See e.g., Michael Hirsh, ‘It’s All Back in Snowden’s Lap,’ Politico (Nov. 
17, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/paris-attack-
isis-snowden-michael-morell-interview-cia-213373 [https://perma.cc/GBL6-
4AAM] (quoting Michael Morrell, former acting head of the CIA, as saying 
“[f]irst, ISIS went to school on how we were collecting intelligence on terrorist 
organizations by using telecommunications technologies. And when they 
learned that from the Snowden disclosures, they were able to adapt to it and 
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Track Terrorists, CNN (Feb. 23, 2015), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2015/02/23/politics/nsa-surveillance-north-korea/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KZ27-CFE3] (quoting the head of the National Security Agency 
who claimed that the Snowden revelations “had a material impact in our 
ability to generate insights as to what counterterrorism, what terrorist 
groups around the world are doing . . . .”). But see Natasha Bertrand, Cyber 
Expert: Idea that Snowden Leaks Facilitated Paris Attacks is ‘A Fantastic 
Work of Intellectual Fiction,’ Bus. Insider (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/edwardsnowdenparisattacks201511 [https:// 
perma.cc/E3X4-GR95] (quoting CEO of cybersecurity firm stating that 
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212. Intelligence Committee Executive Summary, supra note 3, at 2 
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government to potential abuses and waste while preventing the possible 
damage to national security interests that may accompany mass leaks 
of classified material. If states are unwilling to provide secure reporting 
procedures for intelligence-community whistleblowers, the international 
community should adjust the refugee and asylum legal frameworks to 
provide that missing protection to those that report government abuses 
and overreach under the threat of unwarranted retaliation. 
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